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Fetta v. Board of Education
by JOHN PAUL JONES
At an unnecessarily high cost for patients who complained
of unprofessional and sexually invasive treatment, U1e Supreme
Comt of Virginia last fall brought down the curtain on U1e third
of three judicial acts of review in Fetta v. Board of Medicine)
In the end, a doctor won immunity for his misconduct and the
Board of Medicine los t its a ttempt to revoke his license
because it unfairly interfered with an evidentiary hearing. The
conduct of disciplinary proceedings by licensing boards is no
doubt better for the admonition given the Board of Medicine
but U1e net result need not have been so distasteful.
Dr. Patrick J. Petta had treated several women patients
using procedures which lacked an accepted therapeutic purpose and were beyond the legal scope of chiropractic medicine,
concluded the hearing officer after a formal evidentiary hearing. The hearing officer also found that the doctor had committed sexual battery on two patients.

Tainted Evidentiary Proceeding
Four physician members of the Board of Medicine attended
Uuit heating, put numerous questions to witnesses and, at least
once, offered the hearing officer an opinion on the admissibility of certain evidence. A quorum of the Board, which included
the four doctors who had attended the evidentiary hearing, subsequenUy reviewed the hearing transcript and heard arguments
by counsel. It then voted, 14-0, to adopt U1e hearing officer 's
findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to revoke Dr.
Petta's license to practice chiropractic.
Dr. Petta then appealed to ilie circuit court, claiming Ulat
participation by Board members in Ule evidentiary hearing violated his right to a hearing conducted eiilier by the Board or by
a heating officer. The circuit court vacated the Board's decision to revoke Dr. Petta's license and held iliat the presence of
Board members at an evidentiary hearing assigned to a hearing
officer was unlawful, so tainting Ule Board's subsequent decision as to warrant dismissal of the charges against Dr. Fetta.2
Although the record m ade it clear that the Board doctors
who attended the hearing were more than simply silent specta-
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tors, their presence alone was, for the circuit court, enough to
violate the doctor's right under Section 54.1-110 which reads:
Every hearing in a contested case shall be conducted in
accordance with the provisions of the Administrative
Process Act (Section 9-6.14:1 et seq.). When a hearing officer presides, the regulatory board shall determine whether
the hearing officer is to hear the case alone or whether the
board is to hear the case with the hearing officer.
The circuit court found that Section 54.1-110 offered the Board
only two options: a hearing conducted by the Board (or at least
a quorum) or a hearing conducted by a hearing officer alone.
The Court of Appeals affumed, finding the fatal flaw to be
the Board's decision to detail three members to "participate
with the hearing officer."3 The Supreme Court considered that
only the remedy ordered by the courts below was controversial
enough to warrant review. Saying little about participatory
error, nevertheless, the Court affirmed the decision below.
Three courts reached the same two conclusions. First, when
Board members visit an evidentiary heating, ask questions, and
offer opinions on evidence (as permitted by the presiding officer), they violate Section 54.1-110. Second, when the same
Board members later join in the Board's deliberation, all participating members become legally incapable of passing judgment on the case.

cessation of Presiding
What ought to have preceded these conclusions of law is a
finding of fact that the hearing officer stopped presiding- that
is, directing, controlling and governing proceedings. Any finding about the cessation of presiding, moreover, ought to be
fmnly grounded in record evidence, i.e., in ilie transcript of the
administrative hearing. No such findings appeared in the opinions of the three courts reviewing Dr. Petta' s case. The only
facts deemed worU1y of judicial mention were that the board
doctors were allowed by the hearing officer to ask questions of
the witnesses and, on at least one occasion, to offer an opinion
on the admissibility of evidence. The former better buttresses
VIRGINIA LAWYER
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the conclusion that the hearing officer
never stopped presiding, for, otherwise,
how could she still be in a position to
allow or to refuse questions by the interloping board doctors? The latter proves
no thing more than that an indulgent
hearing officer was willing to listen.
E lsewhere in the transcript
lies additional evidence that the
hearing officer never stopped
presiding. At the outset, Dr.
Fetta's counsel appealed to the
hearing officer to exclude the
intruding board doctors, and
then abided by her decision to
the contrary. When Dr. Fetta's
counsel later objected to the
Board doctors putting questions
to witnesses, both sides accepted the hearing officer's ruling
tltat she would allow some questions by the Board doctors but
she would control the privilege
on a question-by-question basis. In fact,
it was the hearing officer's own stated
conclusion that, however the Board doctors might describe their contributions,
she con tinued to preside because she
controlled their questions and because
her findings of fact and conclusions of
law would be what constrained the full
Board's decision afterward.
The Board doctors complied often
enough so that the hearing officer' s
explicit finding that she, and not they,
presided deserves the judicial deference
such a finding of fact is ordinarily due.
After all, she was there at the time, and
the judges of tlte reviewing courts were
not. A careful reading of the transcript
suggests that t11e Board doctors usurped
not the presiding power of the hearing
officer but the prosecuting duty of the
Board's hapless counsel.

wrong Adjudicative Event
If the Board doctors did not preside,
then the evid~ntiary hearing was not
legally deficient as measured by Section
54.1-110. The three courts focused on
the wrong adjudicative event. All three
recognized the harm to proper administrative decision-making which permitted
some members of a collective decisionmaking body to enter into the evidentiary hearing itself while leaving others
to settle for its printed record . But all
three courts pointed in the wrong direction in isolating the res ultant error.
What the four Board doctors did at the
evidentiary hearing was permissible.
What they did at the deliberative meeting afterward was not. The evidentiary
hearing and its report could still have
formed the basis for proper Board action
against Dr. Fetta.

MARCH 1993

The Board should have excused those
members who attended the evidentiary
hearing from its subsequent deliberations. Because the Board has 16 members, and only four attended Dr. Fetta's
hearing, others sufficient for the Board's
quorum of 11 wou ld still have been

required it to make a decision solely on
the basis of what it found in the record
developed in a formal evidentiary hearing, and authorized the court to set aside
a Commission decision that was not
based on substantial evidence found in
that record. Thus, the court could
remand knowing it held a trump
card should it find the Commission again improperly influenced in producing a new decision respecting the appellant.
A decision by the Board of
Medicine to revoke a medical
license is likewise constrained
by the basic law. It, too, must
be supported by substantial evidence in the record produced
after a formal evidentiary hearing. A reviewing Virginia court
would therefore have the same
power to remand a new Board
decision respecting Dr. Fetta's
license if the Board's new decision was
not adequately justified by explicit reference to the record produced at the evidentiary hearing.

available to pass judgment on the hearing officer's report. The Board, however, did not exclude the four who had
attended the evidentiary hearing, and the
case did not reach court until it was too
late for a saving judicial order to
exclude them.
As a federal court of appeals said in a - Rule of Necessity
leading case about federal agency deciEven if it were assumed that the other
sional bias, "[l]itigants are entitled to an
impartial tribunal whether it consists of Board members could not be sufficiently
one man [sic] or 20 and there is no way rehabilitated to make another-litis time
which we know of whereby the influ- unbiased-decision on the record after
ence of one upon the others can be quan- once being exposed to the views of those
titatively measured."4 In that case, the who had attended the evidentiary bearcourt found from a speech by the Chair ing, Ute Rule of Necessity offers another
of the Federal Trade Commission that he alternative for a reviewing court. By tile
had prejudged a complaint of false Rule of Necessity, a judge who would
advertising by the school, so the court ordinarily be disqualified for bias may
invalidated the Commission's s ubse- nevertlleless hear a case when there just
quent decision in which the Chair had is no other judge to do it. The United
States Supreme Court traced the origins
participated.
of the Rule back more than five centuries
in common law and then applied it in
United States v. Will5 to justify a federal
Better Response
court's bearing of a challenge to legislati ve adjustment in the compensation of
What would have been a better federal judges. Kennetll Culp Davis, in
response by the Virginia courts to tainted his widely respected Administrative Law
deliberations rather than ordering the Treatise, wrote more than a decade ago
Board of Medicine to dismiss the case tllat "[t]he doctrine is so clear that it is
permanently, leaving serious charges seldom litigated . . .. " Nonetlleless, there
are numerous cases in which the Rule is
against Dr. Fetta to be ignored forever?
Cinderella Career and Finishing applied, not only to judges, but to adminSchool suggests one answer. The court istrative board members deciding cases.
remanded the case to the Commission for Some are quite recent. In 1991 , for
a new decision, directing the Commis- example, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
sion to exclude its chair from its confer- applied the Rule in Acme Brick Co. v.
ence. The court apparently assumed that Missouri Pacific R. Co. upholding an
Ute other commissioners could, given a order by tile state's Highway Commisfresh start, produce a lawful decision sion.6 In 1990, the Court of Appeals of
even though Utey had once been exposed Missouri applied it to affirm a case decito their chair's biased views. The court's sion by a city council in Fitzgerald v.
assumption was especially justified in City of Maryland Heights. 7
Review ing Virginia courts sho uld
Cinderella Career and Finishing School
because the Commission's basic law have applied the Rule in Petta if they

A
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concluded that rehabilitation could not
wipe the stain of bias even from those
Board members who had not taken part
in the evidentiary hearing. "It is well
settled that where the Legislature vests
in a particular officer or administrative
agency the sole power of investigation
and decision, the Legislature's purpose
cannot be defeated by disqualification of
the designated officer or agency on the
ground of alleged prejudgment or bias."s
The failure of all three courts to apply
the rule in Fetta frustrated the will of the
General Assembly that the Board of
Medicine decide license revocation
cases. The failure also injured the legitimate expectations of complaining
patients that their charges of sexual misconduct would receive serious audience.
When the Rule of Necessity is applied
to decisions by judges, it sometimes permits even the final say by a biased or
prejudiced decider. When the Rule is
applied to decisions by agencies, it usually bas a much less significant impact
beca use of the availability of judicial
review. Applied to the Board of Medicine in Fetta, the Rule would have permitted the Board no more than was permitted t11e FTC in Cinderella Career and
Finishing School, a chance to make a
proper administrative decision-subject
to review by the courts. Dr. Fetta would
still have had the safeguard of review by
the same circuit court and court of
appeals that invalidated the Board's original decision before permitting the Board
(and U1e complaining patients) their second chance. Instead, the doctor got
court-confen·ed immunity.

Every administrative board and
agency empowered to decide cases is
bound to avoid not only acting improperly but also merely appearing to do so.
That duty is not well served by a board
which interferes with evidentiary hearings after it assigns them to hearing officers . The practice surely suggests the
board was prejudging a case not yet
properly before it, and it surely undermines the authority of the officer supposedly enjoying Ule board's trust and confidence sufficiently to be assigned to preside in its stead. Just such a practice was
apparently well established at the Board
of Medicine, however, and so it was high
time that the Board be admonished. For
this discipline, tlle three Fetta judicial
decisions are to be applauded. For
unnecessarily affording the doctor immunity for his misconduct, however, the
same decisions ought properly to be rued.
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